We investigate how changes in the composition of tax revenue affect longrun growth in a broad cross-section of countries. To do this, we construct a new dataset that covers 70 countries (23 high-, 23 middle-and 24 low-income countries), with at least 20 years of observations during the period 1970-2009. In the context of revenueneutral reallocations, we find that increasing consumption and property taxes while reducing income taxes boosts long-term growth. Among income taxes, we find that social security contributions and personal income taxes tend to have a stronger negative association with growth relative to corporate income taxes. Results, however, depend on countries' development levels, suggesting nonlinearities in the relation between taxes and growth even after controlling for convergence effects. Although results are robust for high-and middle-income countries, these are generally not significant for low-income countries.
INTRODUCTION
The question of how tax policy affects growth has been in the forefront of discussions among researchers and policy-makers over the last few decades. On the theoretical front, relatively recent endogenous growth models have successfully laid out the channels through which tax policy changes can affect the rate of capital accumulation (human and physical), labor-leisure tradeoffs, and thereby growth (see Barro, 1990; Jones et al., 1993; King and Rebelo, 1990) . The effects can even be long-lasting, meaning that macro variables are not only affected during the short-run adjustment process, but the steady-state level of output and the long-run rate of economic growth can also be affected. Although some skepticism exists regarding the magnitude of these effects (see, e.g., Mendoza et al., 1997) , these models suggest that tax policy can in principle affect long-run growth in a non-trivial way.
Less conclusive results have been provided so far, however, on the empirical side (see, e.g., Slemrod, 1995; Tanzi and Zee, 1997; Nijkamp and Poot, 2004; Gale and Samwick, 2017) . The most recent works that introduce some elements of the government budget constraint, however, have found a more robust and significant association between tax policy and growth as shown in Kneller et al. (1999) , Gemmell et al. (2011) and Arnold et al. (2011) . These studies have specifically analyzed how changes in the composition of taxes-rather than changes in the overall tax level-affect the economy's income level or its growth rate over the medium and long run.
While most early studies have focused on advanced economies, analyses considering a broader set of countries have been rather limited, with Easterly and Rebelo (1993) being an important exception. They document empirical findings considering about 100 countries during the 1970-88 period and draw conclusions that, in principle, would apply to countries at different levels of development. However, similar broad cross-country studies that consider more recent periods and use more advanced econometric techniques are rather scant, as most recent works in this area has confined the analysis to OECD countries. The policy conclusions derived from these studies, therefore, may not be relevant to nonadvanced economies.
The objective of this paper is to overcome this limitation by investigating the relationship between changes in the tax structure and its effects on long-run growth, considering a broad sample of high-middle-and low-income countries, over the last 40 years. With this objective in mind, we first construct a new dataset using the Government Finance Statistics (GFS) yearbook of the IMF, combined with the Revenue Statistics database of the OECD and the Public Finance Statistics of the UN. Our main data source is GFS, but we use either OECD or UN data sources when they have a better coverage than GFS. Our dataset comprises a total of 70 countries covering the period 1970-2009, in which each country has at least 20 years of observations for both tax revenue and other key macro variables (i.e., GDP growth, population growth, and human and physical capital investment). To the best of our knowledge, this is one of the most comprehensive and up-to-date datasets on taxation and growth considered in the literature. 1 Using this dataset, we study the relationship between revenue-neutral changes in the structure of taxes and long-run economic growth. To estimate this long-run relation, we use the Pool Mean Group (PMG) estimation method proposed by Pesaran et al. (1999) , an approach that has also been considered in previous studies applied to OECD countries. This estimation method distinguishes long-run and transitory effects and estimates them separately. It thus allows us to examine whether changes in the tax structure can have economically meaningful effects on growth not only over short horizons but also in the long run, as the endogenous growth literature, initiated with Barro (1990) , would suggest. 2 Our empirical strategy follows that of Gemmell et al. (2011) , but we depart from them in two fundamental ways. First, we consider a larger set of countries, beyond the OECD. This allows us to examine the extent to which the level of development affects the tax policy and growth nexus. Second, we examine the growth effects of revenue-neutral changes in individual tax categories along the lines of Arnold et al. (2011) , as opposed to theoretical aggregates such as 'distortionary' and 'non-distortionary' taxes as often considered in the literature (e.g., Kneller et al., 1999) . By looking at individual taxes we avoid the inherent difficulties of translating empirical results based on theoretical classifications into specific policy recommendations. 3, 4 We find that, for a given level of tax revenue, relying more on income taxes and less on consumption and property taxes (combined) leads to a reduction in long-run growth. Within income taxes, social security contributions and personal income taxes have a significant and negative relationship with growth. The effect of corporate income taxes depends on the specification of the model. When taxes are introduced in the estimated equations with sufficient lags-to capture collection lags-the effect of corporate income taxes on long-term growth is negative and significant. The negative effect is also larger for countries more open to trade. 5 We also find that a shift from income to either property or VAT and sales taxes has a robust and positive association with growth. When the sample is divided by countries' income levels, we find similar results for high-and middleincome countries. For low-income countries, however, we did not find such robust results. The reasons behind such lack of robustness are not investigated in detail, but we tentatively suggest that it could reflect the relatively poorer quality of tax administration capabilities and thereby the lower taxation level. In fact, our overall results suggest a possible nonlinear relation between the level of taxation and growth. That is, for lower levels of taxation (as observed in low-income countries), reallocations do not tend to have significant growth impacts, whereas 2. Barro (1990) explicitly lays out an endogenous growth model in which income and consumption taxes-equivalent to lump sum taxes in his framework-can affect steady-state growth. Although he does not model explicitly other tax categories, analyzing the growth impact of a larger variety of taxes is a relevant exercise to undertake from a policy perspective. The comprehensiveness of our dataset in terms of tax categories, the variety of countries and the time coverage allows us to do so empirically. 3. Considering individual taxes for OECD countries, Arnold et al. (2011) find a 'tax and growth ranking' in which property taxes, and particularly recurrent taxes on immovable property, are the least harmful taxes for economic activity over the long run, followed by consumption taxes, personal income taxes, and finally corporate income taxes. The policy relevance of considering individual taxes to assess the scope to shift taxation toward a more growth-friendly structure in EU countries is discussed at length in the recent work of W€ ohlbier et al. (2016) . 4. The results of Arnold et al. (2011) , particularly regarding their 'tax and growth ranking', have drawn significant attention in policy and academic debates, and led to studies that challenged the robustness of some results. A recent study by Baiardi et al. (2017) considering OECD countries, for instance, found that the relationships between taxes and growth found in Arnold et al. (2011) become less significant when the sample period and the number of countries are expanded, or when more conservative estimates of standard errors are considered. 5. We thank an anonymous referee for the suggestion to carry out this exercise. the opposite happens for higher levels of taxation (as observed in higher-income countries). This highlights the importance of addressing the differences in countries' levels of development when analyzing the link between tax reallocations and growth.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the dataset. Section 3 presents some stylized facts about the relationship between tax structures and the level of development. In Section 4, we describe our estimation method, to later summarize the main results in Section 5. In Section 6, we address extensively endogeneity, omitted variables and measurement problems. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
DATA
The main source of our dataset is the IMF's Government Finance Statistics (GFS) yearbook. A key challenge to construct it has been the significant change in methodology that took place with the introduction of the GFSM2001 manual (the previous manual was the so-called GFSM1986 manual). It involved changes in the classification of tax revenue and expenditure variables, the form of accounting, and the government coverage level. After a careful application of guidelines to map the two classifications (see Wickens, 2002) and extensive work to construct consistent data over time, we obtained a sample of 90 countries from the GFS yearbook with at least 20 years of observations on tax revenue at the consolidated central government level (CCG) for the period 1970-2009. 6 This GFS dataset is supplemented with other data sources, when they either have better coverage or are more relevant for the analysis. For instance, we consider the general government level for advanced countries owing to their significant degree of decentralization. In this regard, we use tax revenue data at the consolidated general government (CGG) level from the Revenue Statistics database of the OECD for 27 OECD countries during the period 1970-2009. In addition, we rely on the statistics on Public Finances prepared by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean of the UN for six Latin-American countries for the period 1990-2009. In this case, figures cover the CGG level for Argentina and Brazil, whereas for the remaining countries the data refer to the CCG level. Appendix A specifies the data sources and the government coverage level for each country. The remaining macro variables used in this study are obtained from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database of the World Bank, except for average years of schooling, which is taken from Barro and Lee (2010) . 6. Since the GFSM1986 manual did not consider reporting of data at the consolidated general government level, our analysis considers the more restrictive consolidated central government level whenever we use this source. Although this distinction might not be that relevant in certain countries (especially in several low and middle-income countries), we include other sources that consider the broader general government level instead, as indicated below, whenever that information was available.
The final dataset comprises 70 countries with at least 20 years of observations for both tax composition (at least at the most aggregate level) and macro variables. 7 We then divided the whole sample into three groups according to their GDP per capita level (PPP prices) as follows: 23 high-income countries (HICs), 23 middle-income countries (MICs) and 24 low-income countries (LICs). 8 Appendix A provides the list of countries for each income group and presents descriptive statistics.
TAX STRUCTURE AND DEVELOPMENT
Pooling all countries and ordering them by income levels, we can examine how the tax level changes when countries become more developed. To do this, we divide the whole sample into deciles in ascending order, using countries' GDP per capita (PPP prices). We then calculate the median income level and the median value of the relevant tax variable at each decile. This information is summarized in Figures 1 and 2 .
The left panel of Figure 1 shows that the overall level of taxation significantly increases as countries become richer (although this correlation does not indicate any causal link). The right-hand side panel of the figure shows that the tax structure becomes more tilted towards direct taxation (mostly income taxes) as countries' income level increases. Easterly and Rebelo (1993) 's work shows similar patterns in a sample of 28 countries covering the period 1870-1988.
Inspecting tax revenue data at a more disaggregated level provides interesting insights ( Figure 2 ). Regarding income taxes, the collection of personal income taxes (PIT) and social security contributions (SSC) increases sharply with income. Corporate income tax (CIT) collection also increases with income, but its relevance as a revenue source is relatively modest. Property taxes also trend upwards with income, yet even for high-income countries the overall contribution of these taxes as a source of revenue tends to be of limited relevance. The collection of value added taxes (VAT) and sales taxes is also positively associated with income levels. Trade taxes, decrease sharply with countries' development levels, a fact that has been noted elsewhere (e.g., Baunsgaard and Keen, 2010). 9 7. We excluded 20 of the initial 90 countries with available tax data from our final sample, since they do not have 'enough' observations for the additional macro variables used in this study to properly undertake the econometric analysis. 8. The GDP per capita (PPP prices) series is taken from the IMF's World Economic Outlook database.
High-income countries refer to the 23 OECD economies listed as HICs in Table A1 of Appendix A (this includes the 21 OECD countries covered by Arnold et al. (2011) in addition to Iceland and Luxemburg). For the remaining countries (middle-and low-income countries), we looked at whether a country in each particular year has its GDP per capita (PPP prices) above or below the median level determined by all the countries sampled in that year. If the country's GDP per capita was more often above that median, the country is categorized as middle-income country (MIC); if the country's GDP per capita was more often below the median, the country is categorized as low-income country (LIC). 9. Trade taxes refers to all taxes on international trade and transactions, which largely include customs and other import duties, but also other components such as taxes on exports, among others.
Turning to our main focus of analysis, Figure 3 shows how the composition of taxes has varied over time and by country groups when the overall tax level is normalized to 100%. In line with previous figures, Figure 3 shows that HICs rely much more on income taxes relative to LICs. In fact, only about one-third of total taxation is due to income taxes in the case of LICs, whereas between half and two-thirds of total tax revenue has been raised through income taxes in the cases of MICs and HICs, respectively, during the last decades.
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
To estimate the relation between tax composition and growth, we first divide total tax revenue into two broad categories: aggregate income taxes, and aggregate consumption and property taxes. We then estimate how changes in the composition between these two broad categories are related to long-run economic growth considering the full sample of 70 countries. We also consider a further disaggregation to analyze the effects on growth of reallocations involving different tax subcategories. We finally divide the full sample into high-, middle-, and low-income countries to determine how robust results are to cross-country differences in the level of income. 1970-1990 1990-2010 HICs Income Consumption Property Tax data for the 23 HICs are relatively complete: there are usually no missing observations across time and tax categories. Tax data for MICs and LICs are less comprehensive for tax subcategories, yet large enough to undertake estimations for broad tax categories. We consider only those countries with at least 20 years of observations, since the time span of the dataset should be 'long enough' to analyze the long-run effects of tax policy on growth. 10 Our empirical strategy follows that of Gemmell et al. (2011) , namely an error correction model which allows us to estimate separately the long-run equilibrium relation and the associated short-run adjustment dynamics between GDP per capita growth and any relevant fiscal policy variable. However, we depart from them by considering a sample beyond the OECD, to shed light on whether what has been observed for more developed countries also holds for less developed countries. Unlike Gemmell et al. (2011) where taxes are categorized into two theoretical aggregates such as 'distortionary' and 'non-distortionary', we focus instead on the growth effects of individual tax categories along the lines of Arnold et al. (2011) . This provides results that can be used more directly to guide policy decisions, overcoming the inherent challenges of translating results based on theoretical tax classifications into concrete tax policy recommendations.
As indicated, we allow for tax policy changes to have different short-and long-run effects on growth, through the error correction model stated in Equation (1). This framework provides a general approach for testing whether fiscal policy affects growth permanently (as in endogenous growth models) or only transitorily (as in exogenous growth models), an assessment which depends on the significance of the estimated coefficients of the model (see, e.g., Gemmell et al., 2011) . The terms in first differences would capture the short-run dynamics, whereas the expression in parentheses, i.e., the error correction term, would capture the long-run linear equilibrium relation, which is of our main interest (see Appendix B for details about how to derive our model). Our model is specified as follows:
where g is the GDP per capita growth rate (log difference of GDP per capita) for country i at year t; I is the physical investment ratio; h is average years of 10. Specifically, if a country has aggregate income tax data for more than 20 years but does not have data for their subcomponents, we use that country to estimate the growth impact of changes in aggregate income taxes, but the country is then excluded from those specifications involving a more detailed tax disaggregation.
Tax Composition and Growth schooling; 11 n is population growth; T is total tax revenue as a share of GDP; and TC denotes the relevant tax composition variable, expressed as a share of total tax revenue. The parameter À/ is the error correction adjustment parameter. This term is expected to be significant, negative, and smaller than one in absolute value, if the variables return to their long-run equilibrium after an exogenous shock. 12 Standard growth models suggest that long-run growth in GDP per capita can directly be affected by population growth and investment in physical and human capital, regardless of any change in fiscal policy. For this reason, we include them as control variables. A country-specific linear time trend and an intercept are also included. The set of control and tax policy variables are similar to those of Arnold et al. (2011) , with total tax revenue included as a key variable to properly identify the effects of revenue-neutral tax reallocations on growth. 13 Since our estimation technique allows us to separate long-run effects from short-term dynamics, we can consider annual data, rather than period averages as often considered in other studies to correct for business cycles fluctuations. This allows us to preserve a larger number of observations.
We use the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimation approach to estimate Equation (1), as proposed by Pesaran et al. (1999) . The PMG estimator is a useful intermediate procedure between two extreme methods often used to analyze dynamic panel models: the Mean Group (MG) estimator and the Dynamic Fixed Effect (DFE) estimator. At one end, the DFE estimator imposes the strong homogeneity assumption that all the long-and short-run coefficients and error variances are the same across countries. At the other end of the spectrum, the MG model estimates the long-and short-run coefficients separately for each country. The PMG is an intermediate case between these two: it relaxes the strong homogeneity assumption for short-run parameters while still assuming homogeneity in terms of the long-run coefficients. Therefore, PMG estimators provide more efficient estimates than MG estimators, while addressing cross-country heterogeneity in short-run dynamics. For completeness, we also report MG and DFE results along with PMG estimates. 11. We use average years of schooling for population aged between 25 and 64 as a proxy for investment in human capital. This is calculated using the Barro and Lee (2010) database, which provides data on education attainment at 5-year intervals. Missing years are imputed by linear interpolation. 12. The estimates of the error correction adjustment parameter are indeed negative and significant in our baseline specification (see Table 1 ). This shows that the variables of the model return to their long-run equilibrium, validating the use of our specification. 13. As in Arnold et al. (2011) , we include total tax revenue (as a share of GDP) as an additional key control variable. However, we will not interpret the estimated coefficient associated with it. The reason is that we are only interested in the estimated coefficients of tax reallocations on growth for a given level of total tax revenue, but not on the estimated coefficient of total revenue itself.
To properly estimate and interpret the estimated coefficient on total revenue a complete specification of the government budget constraint should be included (see Kneller et al., 1999) . However, as part of our robustness checks we found that total tax revenue as a share of GDP tends to be non-significant even when considering the government budget constraint in full, namely even when either total government spending or the budget balance are added as additional control variables.
As the focus of our study is on the growth effects of changes in the tax composition rather than the overall tax level, all tax variables are included as a share of total tax revenue. Since total tax revenue (as a share of GDP) is also taken as a control variable, any change in one tax component should be offset by a change Overall tax revenue is expressed as a share of GDP, and tax structure variables are expressed as a share of total tax revenue. All equations include short-run dynamics, but only the long-run coefficient estimates are reported. ***denotes significant at 1%, **at 5%, and * at 10% level.
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in other component to keep the overall tax revenue unchanged. We thus omit one tax component at a time in the regression, thereby interpreting the estimated coefficient as the effect of a shift from the omitted variable to the relevant variable under consideration. For instance, we exclude aggregate consumption and property taxes in each equation when estimating the growth impact of changes in income taxes, and vice versa. In this case the rationale is that changes in income taxes are offset by changes in consumption and property taxes in the opposite direction, to keep total tax revenue unchanged. That is, tax policy changes are undertaken in a context of revenue neutrality. Table 1 presents the PMG estimates of the long-run coefficients. 14, 15 Columns (1) and (2) report results of an increase in income taxes compensated by a reduction in consumption and property taxes. Consumption and property taxes are omitted as indicated at the bottom of the table. Column (1) shows that one percentage point increase in the income-tax share offset by one percentage point reduction in the share of consumption and property taxes is associated with a decrease in the longrun growth rate of GDP per capita of around 0.07 percentage points.
RESULTS

Tax composition and growth: full sample
Column (2) considers a similar exercise but disaggregates income taxes into its three subcomponents: personal income taxes (PIT), corporate income taxes (CIT), and social security contributions (SSC). The coefficients for all three subcomponents are negative, yet only the coefficients on PIT and SSC are significant: a one percentage point increase in either SSC or PIT revenue, while reducing consumption and property taxes by the same amount, is associated with a slowdown in growth of 0.17 or 0.16 percentage points, respectively. 16 We also find that the effect of the CIT is somewhat weaker and sensitive to the specification of the model and the data considered in the estimations, an issue discussed later in Section 5.2.
14. The residuals of the different estimated equations presented below have been tested for non-stationarity, using Fisher-type panel unit root tests, i.e., augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillip-Perron tests.
Observe that these tests allow for gaps in the data and can also handle unbalanced panels. In our case, each of these tests strongly rejects the non-stationarity of the residuals at the 1% level of significance. 15. The PMG coefficients are estimated using the xtpmg command in STATA, which estimates the parameters through iterated conditional likelihood maximization. It first estimates the shortrun coefficients and the speed of adjustment, for given initial estimates of the long-run coefficients. Such initial estimates are then used to update the long-run coefficients, and the process is iterated until convergence is achieved (see Blackburne and Frank, 2007) . 16. To put things in perspective, a one percentage point of total revenue reallocated from consumption and property taxes to income taxes is a large tax policy change in our dataset. This would imply, for instance, that the average GDP per capita growth rate could go from 1.6% per year to about 1.7% for the United States, whereas for the average high-income OECD economy it could go from 1.9% per year to about 2%. These are indeed sizable policy reforms, since for the United States it means a shift of 0.3% of GDP from income taxes (18.6% of GDP) to consumption and property taxes (8% of GDP). These figures are even larger for the average high-income OECD economy, since the tax reform would imply shifting 0.4% of GDP from income taxes (21.9% of GDP) to consumption and property taxes (12.8% of GDP).
Columns (3) to (5) summarize the relation between the increase in consumption and property taxes on growth. As noted in the table, income taxes are excluded from the estimation as it is now the offsetting variable. Consistent with column (1), the coefficient on aggregate consumption and property taxes (combined) in column (3) is positive and significant, suggesting that a shift from income taxes to consumption and property taxes is growth enhancing.
Column (4) in turn shows that, while both consumption taxes and property taxes are positively associated with growth, property taxes have a stronger association relative to consumption taxes (the equality hypothesis on the two coefficients is strongly rejected with a p-value close to zero). When consumption taxes are further disaggregated in column (5), we find that VAT and sales taxes have the strongest association with growth among all consumption-tax components. 17 In fact, one percentage point increase in VAT and sales taxes offset by a reduction in income taxes is associated with a 0.11 percentage point increase in longrun growth. In addition, we do not find a significant relation between growth and trade taxes in the full-sample case-one reason could be the fact that trade taxes have different effects on growth for different country groups (see, Section 5.2).
These baseline results are in general robust to adding other control variables (Appendix C) and different estimation techniques, except for the effects of the CIT, which instead depend on the source of the data and the model's specification, as discussed below. 18 In fact, the CIT has a statistically significant and negative effect when the estimating equation includes sufficient lags, or when the tax is interacted with a measure of openness (see Section 6 for details).
As mentioned before, the PMG estimation method is an intermediate procedure between the mean group (MG) and the dynamic fixed effect (DFE) model. While the PMG estimator yields efficient and consistent estimates when the homogeneity assumption on long-run parameters is valid, it is inconsistent if the true model is heterogeneous. To test the validity of the homogeneity assumption, we perform a Hausman test. Comparing the MG and PMG estimators in every regression equation (Table 2) , this test strongly suggests that we cannot reject the homogeneity assumption on the long-run coefficients-p-values are very high for all specifications. Accordingly, we prefer the PMG estimator to the MG estimator. 19 For completeness, we also present MG and DFE estimates in Table 2 . The coefficients are often different in size across models. However, the PMG and DFE estimates are generally consistent in their sign and at times statistical significance. At the aggregate level, they all suggest that a shift from consumption and 17. In our estimations, we use the tax category of general taxes on goods and services (GFS classification) as a proxy for VAT and sales taxes. This category also includes other general taxes on goods and services. The size of the latter is, however, small. 18. Results are also robust to the use of different breakdowns for population growth or proxies for labor force growth. These results are available from the authors upon request. 19. A word of caution should be added here. The Hausman test has a relatively low power, as indicated by Pesaran et al. (1999) : that is, in this case, it may fail to reject the null hypothesis of homogeneous long-run equilibrium, even when the hypothesis is false. This concern is also noted in Gemmell et al. (2011) and Xing (2012) . This justifies considering and estimate separate regressions for different country groups, as we do in the next subsection.
property taxes to income taxes is associated with slower growth. In more detailed decompositions, they confirm the existence of a negative association between SSC and growth, and that VAT and sales taxes and property taxes have a positive and significant growth effects.
Tax composition and growth: high, middle and low-income countries
One key observation in Section 3 was that countries with different income levels have different tax burdens and tax structures. To further investigate whether the relation between the tax structure and long-run growth varies with the degree of development, we now conduct an analysis like that of Section 5.1 but considering each country group separately. As in the full-sample case, we obtain negative and significant coefficients on income taxes for both HICs and MICs: raising income taxes while reducing consumption and property taxes is associated with lower growth ( Table 3 ). The size of the coefficients for both groups is bigger than in the full-sample case: a percentage point increase in income taxes is associated with a slowdown in growth of about 0.16 percentage points. Also, the negative relation between income taxes and growth appears to be driven by social security contributions and personal income taxes, rather than by corporate income taxes. In fact, the coefficients on PIT and SSC are always negative, and significant and larger in absolute value than that of the CIT. 20 Table 4 presents the growth impact of the tax shift in the opposite direction: from income to consumption and property taxes. For HICs, we have a positive and significant coefficient on consumption and property taxes, and the absolute size of the coefficient is similar to the one for aggregate income taxes of column (1) in Table 3 . When we separate consumption and property taxes for this group of countries, results remain similar to the full-sample case: property taxes have a stronger association with growth than consumption taxes (the equality hypothesis of the coefficients on consumption and property taxes is strongly rejected (p-value of 0.015)). Within consumption taxes and in line with the full-sample case, we find that the coefficient on VAT and sales taxes is positive and significant: a percentage point shift from income taxes to VAT and sales taxes boosts growth by about 0.2 percentage points over the long run. For MICs, the coefficient on consumption and property taxes (combined) is also positive and significant. When property taxes are separated from consumption taxes in column (5), we still find that they have a strong relation with growth, yet in this case the effect is less significant. When consumption taxes are disaggregated in column (8), the coefficient on VAT and sales taxes is positive and significant, as in the case of HICs.
For LICs, however, we generally do not find a significant relationship between economic growth and most tax structure variables. We suggest this could be due 20. The clustering of the sample by income levels also allows us to check whether results are robust to data sources. For instance, considering macro variables from the OECD and human capital data from Arnold et al. (2007) (available only for HICs), we find that, the coefficients on SSC and PIT are always negative and significant, while the coefficient on the CIT tends to be nonrobust. With these data, the Wald tests strongly suggest that SSC and PIT have a stronger negative relation with growth than the CIT.
to their relatively poorer quality of tax administration capacity and narrower tax bases, which could lead to low taxation levels and thereby weaker linkages with growth. Furthermore, the fact that we find different results when only considering LICs suggests that the effects of tax reallocations on growth are affected by countries' income levels, and thereby caution should be taken when applying results based solely on OECD countries to economies with a lower level of development. One important exception, however, is that trade taxes appear to be We often lose significance of coefficients in MG estimates due to the large estimates for variances. This is not surprising, because the MG model estimates both long-run and short-run coefficients with a more limited number of observations given by each country's own time series. Thus, the fit of the MG estimation tends to be poorer, and extreme outliers can distort substantially the estimated coefficients- Pesaran et al. (1999) also raised this issue. Notes: We only report the long-run coefficients on tax variables. The regression specification in this table is the same as that of Table 1 , except for different assumptions imposed on long-and short-run coefficients depending on the estimation methods namely, PMG, MG, and DFE. *** denotes significant at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.
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negatively associated with growth in a significant way in this subsample. This finding is relevant since trade taxes are a particularly important source of revenue in these economies. 21
From taxes to growth: channels of transmission
So far we have found evidence on how the different taxes affect long-term growth in a revenue-neutral context for an average country. We have also discussed how the effects differ depending on countries' income levels. We now discuss the transmission mechanisms of specific taxes on growth, starting from the most growth-friendly taxes. Overall tax revenue is expressed as a share of GDP, and tax structure variables are expressed as a share of total tax revenue. All equations include short-run dynamics, but only the long-run coefficient estimates are reported. ***denotes significant at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Baunsgaard and Keen (2010) for further insights into the relevance and trends in the collection of trade taxes in low-income countries. A further investigation on the mechanisms and the extent to which higher trade taxes can lead to lower growth in these countries is left as a relevant topic for future research. Omitted tax variable
See
Income taxes
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Overall tax revenue is expressed as a share of GDP, and tax structure variables are expressed as a share of total tax revenue. All equations include short-run dynamics, but only the long-run coefficient estimates are reported.
*** denotes significant at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.
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Property taxes, and particularly those on immovable properties, have well regarded efficiency properties as they are levied on accumulated wealth and on a base which is likely to have a low elasticity of substitution (Norregaard, 2013) . Consumption taxes, could either be neutral from a growth perspective, or have a negative growth impact depending on their effects on labor-education and labor-leisure tradeoffs, given households' preferences as reflected, for instance, in the elasticity of labor supply. In fact, if the labor supply is perfectly inelastic, the growth impact of consumption taxes essentially vanishes (Mendoza et al., 1997) . These theoretical implications would hold for the VAT, to the extent that it is raised through a uniform rate and a broad base. Otherwise, negative efficiency effects may arise through complex interactions stemming from differentiated VAT rates and exemptions. A higher reliance on trade taxes, however, is likely to limit the scope for international competition, dampening the economy's absorption of new technologies and thereby reducing growth (Easterly and Rebelo, 1993; Zee, 1996) . Income taxes (levied on physical and human capital), including social security contributions, can have growth-retarding effects by reducing the after-tax return of physical and human capital; that is, through substitution effects which lead to reductions in labor supply and investment.
The design of individual taxes, however, can also have a critical relevance to explain how taxes affect growth. For instance, a well-designed corporate income tax with an allowance for corporate equity might be better for growth than a poorly designed VAT (IMF, 2009a,b) . In general tax exemptions may lead to distortions which reduce efficiency, although some of them could be justified in certain circumstances (e.g., tax credits for low-wage earners). Rent-seeking Notes: The second row of each group reports the number of countries in which the coefficients on error correction terms in marginal model, equation (2), are statistically significant at 5% level.
behavior arising from tax exemptions, moreover, can ultimately hamper longterm growth (Tanzi and Zee, 1997) . Thus, a detailed assessment of how taxation affects the economy should consider the direct incentives it creates for the accumulation of physical and human capital, and how the design of taxes affects tax avoidance, evasion, and the associated compliance costs; all elements which will ultimately affect long-term growth.
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
There are several potential shortcomings in growth regressions that include tax policy variables, related to endogeneity, the omission of relevant variables or possible measurement errors, to name just a few. These problems would bias results, thus limiting the explanatory power of the econometric analysis. We now explore these potential shortcomings.
Endogeneity
Endogeneity would make it difficult to interpret the estimated coefficients as the impact of tax policy changes on growth. This follows from the simultaneous relation between the two: not only the tax structure may affect growth, but also changes in GDP growth may induce changes in the level of taxes or its structure. The estimated coefficients may then capture the correlation between the two variables, rather than a causal effect from tax changes to growth. The most likely source of this endogeneity problem is the correlation between aggregate income and the level of taxation (see Section 3). However, this tends to be less of a concern in regressions of GDP growth rates (rather than GDP levels). In Appendix D, we present two scatterplots that show correlations between GDP and different tax variables (total revenue and countries' direct-toindirect tax ratios). As shown in Figure 1D , there is a clear positive correlation between tax variables and GDP level, but this tends to disappear when the growth rate is considered instead, as evidenced by Figure 2D . This highlights that using growth rates as in our case, i.e., by taking first differences in the (log) level of GDP, we could better control for country-specific, income-level factors that may affect the tax structure. 22 Nevertheless, in consideration of this potential shortcoming, we take the following approach. First, we test for weak exogeneity on a country-by-country basis, and then check whether our main results remain robust after excluding from the sample those countries that seem to suffer from endogeneity problems. Second, we estimate our baseline PMG model but with all tax variables lagged by one year. Third, we estimate the long-run relationship between taxes and growth indicated in Equation (1), using instrumental variables (IV).
22. For similar reasons, Gemmell et al. (2011) also consider a specification with GDP growth rates to examine the growth impact of fiscal variables.
In our (single-equation) error correction model, a minimum requirement to make valid inference on the long-run equilibrium relation is that the tax variables are weakly exogenous to the long-run parameters. 23 That is, changes in the tax structure should not react to deviations from the long-run equilibrium relationship of Equation (1). If changes in the tax structure react to this deviation, this would imply that we might be estimating the effect of growth on the tax structure, rather than vice versa, or both (Gemmell et al., 2012) .
To test for weak exogeneity, we follow Calderon et al. (2011) , an approach also taken in Gemmell et al. (2012) . Their approach is based on the seminal works of Johansen (1992) and Boswijk (1995) , yet developed specifically in the context of a PMG estimation. In particular, we first estimate marginal models to examine the effects of the deviation from the long-run relationship (captured by the longrun error correction term) on the changes in tax variables. We then test whether the coefficient on the error correction term is zero. For instance, for the specification in column (2) in Table 1 , we test the significance of the coefficients on the error correction terms, d i , in the following system of marginal models:
where the terms in parentheses are the estimated long-run equilibrium errors derived from Equation (1). We estimate the system of equations on a countryby-country basis, using the seemingly unrelated regression equation estimator proposed by Zellner (1962) . We then test the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the error correction terms are jointly zero, using a Wald test at a 5% significance level. If the null hypothesis is rejected, this would imply that the associated tax variables react to deviations from the long-run relation, thus suggesting that the country under consideration violates the weak exogeneity condition.
We test this marginal model for every specification, and Table 5 shows the number of countries that seem to violate this condition. We then reestimate the PMG model excluding these countries.
As can be seen in Table 6 , our main results carry through. However, the size of the coefficients on aggregate income taxes and consumption and property taxes 23. Johansen (1992) and Boswijk (1995) show that estimations for the long-run coefficients are efficient (i.e., that the single-equation ECM contains full information, or the singleequation estimators are equivalent to the estimators resulting from the system estimation of all equations), if conditioning variables are weakly exogenous.
are slightly smaller in absolute terms after the exclusion, whereas the standard errors are larger-this is not surprising given that we lose over 600 and 400 observations, respectively, in each estimation. Nevertheless, these coefficients remain significant and properly signed. Our results remain broadly robust to a more granular decomposition as can be seen in Table 6 , and by country groups. 24 As a second test, we reestimate the baseline PMG model but taking a one-year lag of all tax variables. This follows Gemmell et al. (2011) , and addresses reverse causality from growth to tax variables. The results are consistent with our baseline estimations ( Table 7 ). The main difference is that the CIT is now statistically significant and negatively associated with growth in both the full sample and across income groups, suggesting that lags in the collection of taxes better isolate the causal effects of the CIT on growth (see also Section 6.2). 25 As a final robustness check, we consider an Instrumental Variables (IV) approach, also along the lines of Gemmell et al. (2011) . We use the IV approach with two models: one which uses a reduced sample with 5-year non-overlappingaverages (as in Kneller et al. (1999) ), and another which uses the whole sample of annual data, since the number of observations drops significantly when averaging the sample. As instruments we include lags of the endogenous variables and lags of VAT statutory rates. 26 In general, results are consistent with those of the baseline specification, except that the coefficient on the CIT becomes statistically significant, whereas consumption and property taxes are somewhat less significant. Diagnostic tests for the validity of instruments are also generally good, although they tend to be weaker with the 5-year averages specification (likely due to the smaller sample size). 27
Omitted variables and measurement issues
As mentioned, our results could be susceptible to omitted variable biases or measurement errors. For instance, effects can be biased because of different collection lags in taxes (i.e., some taxes take time to be collected, while others are collected more instantaneously). 28 To some extent, this could be assessed by reestimating the baseline PMG model of Equation (1), but including lagged variables of taxes as considered previously for the endogeneity tests. And as noted already in Table 7 , results remain consistent with those of the baseline, except that the CIT becomes negative and significant, suggesting that collection lags could be relevant for this tax.
We also investigate whether the degree of openness could affect results, particularly regarding the CIT. This could be the case since more open countries could be exposed to swifter changes in the base of operation of large companies due to 24. For brevity results by country groups when countries with potential endogeneity issues are excluded are not presented, but are available from the authors upon request. 25. Detailed results for HICs, MICs, and LICs are available from the authors upon request. 26. The database on statutory rates was provided by the Fiscal Affairs Department of the IMF. Due to limited data availability for MICs and LICs, we could not consider statutory rates for personal income taxes and corporate income taxes in our regressions. 27. Results are available from the authors upon request. 28. We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this additional assessment. tax arbitrage, thereby affecting the base of that tax. Introducing openness as an additional regressor-measured as the sum of exports and imports divided by GDP-does not affect our main conclusions. But the interaction between openness and the CIT indeed affects results: the CIT coefficient becomes positive, Table 1 because countries with a potential endogeneity problem are dropped from the estimation of each corresponding specification. *** denotes significant at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.
while the interaction term is negative (Table C1 , Column 6). This indicates that for relatively open economies reallocations to the CIT tend to be detrimental for growth. 29 Given that any additional collection of taxes could be devoted to spending items which could have growth effects on their own, we also consider total government balance as an additional control variable. Although the sample is significantly reduced (between two-thirds and three-quarter of observations are lost), Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Overall tax revenue is expressed as a share of GDP, and tax structure variables are expressed as a share of total tax revenue. Lagged regressors are indicated by 'L.' in front of the variables. All equations include short-run dynamics, but only the long-run coefficient estimates are reported. *** denotes significant at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.
29. We found that the effect becomes negative for countries which have openness larger than 86% of GDP-roughly about 33% of the countries in the sample. We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this exercise.
as shown in Table 8 , we did not find major differences in results, besides the fact that significance tends to be lower (likely associated with the smaller sample size). Finally, we evaluate if differences in countries' development levels could lead to another source of omitted variable bias. For instance, as countries get richer growth peters out, but the share of income taxes in total taxation could still increase due to their progressive nature. Thus, a negative correlation between the Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Overall tax revenue is expressed as a share of GDP, and tax structure variables are expressed as a share of total tax revenue. All equations include short-run dynamics, but only the long-run coefficient estimates are reported. *** denotes significant at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.
growth rate of GDP and the share of income taxes could be present without implying a causal effect. 30 As an additional test for this, in case there are convergence elements not properly accounted for in our previous estimation methods, we estimated a model a la Barro (2015) , namely considering growth between periods t and t + 4 as dependent variable, but with all regressors including tax variables and the initial real GDP per capita, measured at period t À 1 (time fixed effects are also included). Results presented in Table 9 suggest that indeed convergence effects are relevant, but even in this case results for the full sample are broadly consistent with those of the baseline, yet with the CIT showing once more a negative and significant coefficient (other taxes do show, however, smaller effects in absolute value and a somewhat more reduced significance, which are not surprising findings given the more limited sample size). 31
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper investigated empirically the relation between changes in the tax structure and long-run growth, a topic extensively studied for high-income countries (e.g., Arnold et al., 2011; Gemmell et al., 2011; Kneller et al., 1999) . Our main contribution to this literature has been to extend the analysis to a broader set of countries, including both OECD and non-OECD economies, to assess the extent to which countries' development levels matter in understanding the tax and growth nexus.
As in similar studies, we found that a shift from consumption and property taxes to income taxes is negatively associated with long-run growth. In particular, we showed that tax reallocations involving higher social security contributions and personal income taxes exhibit a stronger negative association with growth relative to those involving higher corporate income taxes, which tend to be non-significant in our baseline specifications. However, when considering lags in the collection of taxes, the interaction between corporate taxation and openness, and instrumental variables, the strength and significance of corporate taxes as negative for growth found in other studies tend to be ratified. Certainly, a more detailed assessment on the links between corporate income taxation and growth is left as an important topic for further analysis.
We also found that a shift from income to property taxes has a more significant and positive association with long-run growth than a shift, instead, to consumption taxes. Among consumption taxes, however, we found a positive and significant association between increases in VAT and sales taxes and growth, when this tax increase is offset with a reduction in income taxes. While we consistently found these results to hold in the high-and middleincome countries samples, we did not find robust and significant results for low-income countries. This highlights the importance of considering differ-30. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this. 31. Given the reduced number of observations in that case we could not reasonably undertake robust estimations by country groups. ences in countries' development levels when analyzing the link between tax reallocations and growth. Our main results remain essentially unchanged when we addressed endogeneity concerns, for instance through the exclusion of countries for which their respective tax variables do not satisfy weak exogeneity conditions. Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Overall tax revenue is expressed as a share of GDP, and tax structure variables are expressed as a share of total tax revenue. *** denotes significant at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.
Some interesting policy conclusions could emerge from the analysis. Highand middle-income countries may want to consider reallocations from those taxes levied on labor towards those levied on consumption and properties to boost growth (detailed recommendations for specific EU countries can be found, for instance, in W€ ohlbier et al., 2016). Such policy measures could be particularly relevant in advanced countries experiencing high unemployment rates, and emerging countries suffering from large informality rates in the labor market. Within income taxes, results suggest that economies that are relatively more closed may be less pressing for reductions in corporate taxation with the aim of boosting growth. For low-income countries, however, results suggest that larger reliance on either income or consumption taxes may not have growth impacts. The fact that these economies are having low levels of taxation anyway suggests that they may not be at a point yet where tax reallocations significantly affect growth-an exception seems to be trade taxes, for which reallocations away from this revenue source seem to boost growth.
We have only analyzed here the effects of tax reallocations on growth, leaving aside other criteria through which policy-makers may also want to evaluate the overall impact of taxation on the economy. We have not assessed, for instance, the effects of tax reallocations on income inequality, which is an important area for future research. Another important element that deserves further attention is the presence of nonlinearities in the relation between taxation and growth. Indeed, our results by country groups suggest that taxes affect growth unevenly depending on countries' development levels. Thus, having a more comprehensive assessment of how nonlinearities in the effects of taxes on growth operate is left as another important and timely extension for the future.
APPENDIX A
DATA SOURCES AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
This appendix describes the countries, variables and data sources used in our study and presents key summary statistics. Table A1 lists countries for each income group, as well as the sources of their tax data and government coverage level (CGG denotes consolidated general government and CCG denotes consolidated central government). Then, Tables A2 and A3 present summary statistics for tax and macro variables, respectively. (1) in the main text can be derived from the following autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL (1,1)) model:
Tax Composition and Growth
showing that current growth (g t ) is affected by lagged growth (g t-1 ), and also by current and lagged control variables (x t and x t-1 ). When x t includes fiscal variables, this specification embeds the key predictions of endogenous growth models such as Barro (1990) , namely that fiscal policy can either have permanent effects on growth and/or on its transitional dynamics. If |a 1 | < 1, there is a stable long-run relation between g t and x t . Taking unconditional expectations of this expression yields (the time dimension t is omitted):
where the steady-state effect of x on g is captured by the coefficient b 0 þb 1 1Àa 1 . The ARDL (1,1) model in Equation (B1) can then be reparameterized into an error correction model (ECM) that takes the following form 32 :
Estimating this ECM has key advantages:
• The long-run effect of x on g, b 0 þb 1 1Àa 1 , is estimated as the coefficient on x t-1 .
• By separating the short-and long-run coefficients, this specification explicitly models that some fiscal variables have only short-run effects, whereas others may have both short-and log-run effects on growth.
• Because the dependent variable and the short-run dynamics of the model are taken in first differences, spurious regression type of concerns are avoided.
APPENDIX C ADDITIONAL CONTROL VARIABLES
As an additional robustness check, we include alternative control variables to the regression considered in Table 1 . Inflation refers to the growth rate of the GDP deflator, and trade openness denotes the sum of exports and imports of goods and services as a share of GDP.
32. If ja 1 j\1 (i.e., g t does not explode), there may be a long-run relationship between x and g, a relation that can be represented through an error correction model. Since this specification is just a reparameterization of an ADL model (see Davidson et al., 2004) , it follows that the ECM does not necessarily need to be linked to cointegration analysis. Therefore, this approach may be even used in the context of stationary data. 
(3) Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Overall tax revenue is expressed as a share of GDP, and tax structure variables are expressed as a share of total tax revenue. All equations include short-run dynamics, but only the long-run coefficient estimates are reported.
*** denotes significant at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. 
(3) 
